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Abstract
Machine learning (ML) models are applied in an increas-
ing variety of domains. The availability of large amounts
of data and computational resources encourages the devel-
opment of ever more complex and valuable models. These
models are considered intellectual property of the legitimate
parties who have trained them, which makes their protec-
tion against stealing, illegitimate redistribution, and unau-
thorized application an urgent need. Digital watermarking
presents a strong mechanism for marking model ownership
and, thereby, offers protection against those threats. The
emergence of numerous watermarking schemes and attacks
against them is pushed forward by both academia and indus-
try, which motivates a comprehensive survey on this field.
This document at hand provides the first extensive literature
review on ML model watermarking schemes and attacks
against them. It offers a taxonomy of existing approaches
and systemizes general knowledge around them. Further-
more, it assembles the security requirements to watermark-
ing approaches and evaluates schemes published by the sci-
entific community according to them in order to present sys-
tematic shortcomings and vulnerabilities. Thus, it can not
only serve as valuable guidance in choosing the appropriate
scheme for specific scenarios, but also act as an entry point
into developing new mechanisms that overcome presented
shortcomings, and thereby contribute in advancing the field.
1 Introduction
In recent years, machine learning (ML) has experienced
great advancements. Its ability to process ever larger and
more complex datasets has led to its application in a versa-
tile and growing number of domains. The performance of
the applied models, thereby, largely depends on the qual-
ity and quantity of their training data. However, the pro-
cess of training data collection, cleansing, processing, or-
ganizing, storing, and in certain cases even manual label-
ing is time-consuming and expensive. So is the training
process itself, as it may require large computational capaci-
ties, e.g. in the form of numerous GPUs, and know-how for
hyperparameter-tuning. As a consequence, a trained ML
model may be of high value and is to be considered intel-
lectual property of the legitimate owner, i.e. the party that
created it.
The value incorporated in trained ML models may turn
them into lucrative attack targets for malicious adversaries
who want to steal their functionality [2] for redistribution or
to offer their own paid services based on it. Given the broad
attack surface of stealing ML models, it might be impos-
sible to entirely prevent theft. If theft cannot be prevented
beforehand, a legitimate model owner might want to react
at least to the inflicted damage and claim copyright to take
further steps. This, however, requires that the stolen intel-
lectual property can be traced back to its legitimate owner
through adequate labeling.
The idea of marking digital property is called water-
marking. It refers to the act of embedding identification in-
formation into some original data to claim copyright, how-
ever, without affecting the data usage. Watermarking is al-
ready broadly used in digital media, for example in images,
where a watermark may consist of a company logo inserted
somewhere into the picture. See [30] for a survey on water-
marking approaches in digital media.
This concept of watermarking can also be adopted for
tagging ML models. So far, several methods to generate
such watermarks in ML models have been proposed in re-
search. Additionally, ways to detect, suppress, remove, or
forge existing watermarks have been proposed. However,
to the authors’ knowledge, to date there exists no extensive
overview on concepts and methods in the field. This article
intends to systematize the different approaches proposed so
far, in order to make watermarking methods more usable
and accessible. The concrete contributions by this work are
as follows:
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• Comprehensive literature review of the field of water-
marking in neural networks.
• Taxonomy of watermarking schemes and attacks pro-
posed by different parties.
• Systematization of desirable security properties of ML
model watermarks and evaluation of given approaches
according to those properties.
The watermarking schemes presented in the following are
developed to work with neural networks (NN) for classifi-
cation.
The document at hand is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly introduces the basics of ML and model ex-
traction. It furthermore gives an overview on the secu-
rity requirements for ML model watermarks, and on water-
mark generation and verification. Section 3 presents a de-
tailed depiction of the watermarking schemes proposed in
research. Section 4 depicts attack scenarios against water-
marking schemes, grouped according to their purpose. Sec-
tion 5 discusses aspects of choosing a good watermarking
scheme for a given scenario. Finally, Section 6 and Sec-
tion 7 present an outlook on future research in watermarking
of ML models and add conclusive remarks, respectively.
2 Basic Concepts and Taxonomy
To start with, this section provides a brief overview on
ML and on model extraction attacks. Afterwards, it intro-
duces the security requirements for ML model watermarks
and gives an overview into watermark embedding and veri-
fication.
2.1 Machine Learning
ML consists of two phases, training and infer-
ence/testing. During training, an ML model hθ is given a
training dataset Ds to fit its parameters θ on. For classifica-
tion tasks, the training data has the form (x, y) with x de-
noting the feature vector and y the target class. The model
parameters are adjusted through minimizing a loss function
that expresses the distance between predictions hθ(x) and
true targets y [26].
At test time, once the model parameters θ are fit, the
function hθ() can be applied to new and unseen data x′
to produce predictions on them. A model that performs
well solely on the training data, is called to overfit that data,
whereas a model that also performs well on the unseen test
data is said to exhibit a good generalization capacity. Per-
formance is usually expressed in terms of accuracy, which
is the percentage of correct predictions over all predictions.
2.2 Model Extraction
A model extraction attack refers to stealing a target
model hθ through black-box access, i.e. through posing
queries to the model over a predefined interface. An ad-
versary might use those queries to hθ to obtain labels for
unlabeled data Ds′ from distribution D. Given Ds′ and the
corresponding labels obtained from the original model, the
adversary can train a surrogate model h′θ that incorporates
the original model’s functionality. Jagielski et al. [15] dis-
tinguish between two types of model extraction. A fidelity
extraction attack is considered successful, if h′θ reproduces
hθ with small deviation. Hence, when hθ is erroneous w.r.t.
the ground truth label of a data point, so is h′θ. A task ac-
curacy extraction aims at extracting a model that solves ap-
proximately the same underlying decision task [15].
Potential adversaries may conduct model extraction at-
tacks to have unlimited access to the model’s complex func-
tionality without the high preparation, or continuous per
query costs. Alternatively, they may wish to use the stolen
model as a departure point for further attacks that are ren-
dered more efficient through model parameter access, e.g.
adversarial sample crafting [5, 36]. Protecting ML models
against theft is a challenging task, as by definition, the mod-
els are supposed to reveal some information to the users.
Hence, in addition to the classical security risks of model
theft e.g. malicious insider access, successful attacks on
servers hosting the model, or side-channel attacks [3]), the
information legally revealed by the model can be exploited.
Some research was conducted in order to issue security
warnings, once an ML model is about to reveal enough in-
formation that an adversary or a group of adversaries might
be able to extract its functionality [17]. Further research
focused on creating models that solely achieve high accu-
racy when being queried by an authorized user [8]. Other
work was directed towards the development of models that
are more difficult to steal, e.g. by only returning hard la-
bels and no probabilities per output class, by perturbing the
prediction outputs [25], or by designing networks that are
extremely sensitive to weight changes, which makes it dif-
ficult for an adversary to steal and adapt them [35].
2.3 Watermarking
Due to the numerous possibilities of attacks, preventing
ML model theft entirely might be infeasible. However, it
is possible to apply the concept of digital watermarking to
ML. By embedding an adequate watermark into their ML
models, legitimate parties become able to identify stolen
model instances. This fact might discourage adversaries to
steal the models in the first place, or offer at least the pos-
sibility for the model owners to claim their rights before a
court after theft.
2
2.3.1 Requirements for Watermarking
Within the last years, several requirements for watermark-
ing algorithms have been formulated by different parties,
e.g. [1, 6, 21, 37]. See Table 1 for an overview on the re-
quirements and their practical implications.
2.3.2 Watermark Embedding
Watermarking techniques that have been proposed so far
can be divided into two broad categories.
1. Inserting the watermark or related information directly
into the model parameters.
2. Creating a trigger, carrier or key dataset, which con-
sists of data points that evoke an unusual prediction be-
havior in the marked model. This unusual behavior can
be used in order to identify illegitimate model copies.
The trigger dataset can be generated independently, or
based on the original training data.
See Figure 1 for a visualization of the concepts of both cat-
egories. Section 3 presents the existing approaches grouped
by those categories more in detail.
Additionally, some methods rely on using existing fea-
tures of the models themselves as fingerprints to identify
potentially stolen instances. As those methods do not re-
quire explicitly inserting additional information as water-
marks into the models, they will only be mentioned briefly
in this document.
Independently of the category, it is possible to insert a
watermark to a given model at different points of the train-
ing process. 1) During Training: The watermark is inserted
while training the model from scratch. This scenario is use-
ful for model owners who want to mark their intellectual
property during training. 2) During Fine-Tuning: After the
model is trained on its original task, the watermark is in-
cluded by fine-tuning. Fine-tuning may change the NN’s
configuration near the output layer. This scenario can be
used in order to mark an already trained model, or to em-
bed individual watermarks into different model instances
for distribution to different parties [37].
2.3.3 Watermark Verification
There are two broad scenarios for watermark verification.
In a white-box scenario, a legitimate model owner is granted
access to the model parameters in order to check for the wa-
termark in potentially stolen copies of a model. This might
be needed when the watermark is embedded into the model
parameters alone. However, in many scenarios, white-box
access for verification is no realistic assumption. A more
realistic scenario is a black-box access scenario in which
a legitimate model owner can access the potentially stolen
model solely through a predefined query interface. When
selecting an adequate watermarking method, the access sce-
nario for verification needs to be taken into account.
3 Watermarking Techniques
Given the two categories of watermarking schemes, this
section first presents methods that rely on watermark em-
bedding directly to the model parameters. Afterwards, it
depicts the approaches that use a trigger dataset to mark a
model.
3.1 Embedding Watermarks into Model Parame-
ters
Table 2 provides an overview on the methods that rely on
inserting watermarks directly into the model parameters.
Early approaches to mark ML models with the aim of in-
cluding information about the training data into the model
parameters were proposed by Song et al. [34]. Among oth-
ers, they showed how to include information in the least
significant bits of the model parameters or the parameters’
signs, and developed a correlated value encoding, to max-
imize a correlation between the model parameters and a
given secret. A similar method was then applied by Uchida
et al. [37] as the first explicit watermarking scheme in
NNs. The authors interpret the watermark as a T -bit string
{0, 1}T . In order to include it into the model parameters,
they use a composed loss function L(θ) = LO + λLR(θ)
with LO being the loss of the original task and LR an em-
bedding regularizer. This regularizer imposes a statistical
bias on certain model parameters in order to represent the
watermark. The factor λ influences the bit error for ex-
traction. To project the weights carrying the watermark in-
formation, an embedding parameter X is used. This X ,
therefore, serves as a secret key that is needed for water-
mark embedding and verification. The authors’ experiments
show that the approach worked best for projections to ran-
dom weight within the model.
Wang et al. [39] extend this work by developing an alter-
native for the embedding parameter. Instead, they employ
an additional independent NN on selective parameters from
the original model to project the watermark. For training
of the original model, they use the above-mentioned loss
function L(θ) = LO + λLR(θ). To train the additional
NN, they apply the binary cross-entropy loss between its
output vector and the watermark. The additional NN is
not released publicly and serves for watermark verification.
For high fidelity on the original task, the authors proposed
embedding the watermark into early converging model pa-
rameters. Wang et al. [40], however, showed that such ap-
proaches do not meet the requirement of watermark security
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Table 1: Requirements for watermarking techniques. Definitions adopted from [1, 6, 21, 37].
Requirement Explanation Motivation
Fidelity Prediction quality of the model on its original task
should not be degraded significantly
Ensures the model’s performance on the original
task
Robustness Watermark should be robust against removal at-
tacks
Prevents attacker from removing the watermark to
avoid copyright claims of the original owner
Reliability Exhibit minimal false negative rate Allows legitimate users to identify their intellec-
tual property with a high probability
Integrity Exhibit minimal false alarm rate Avoids erroneously accusing honest parties with
similar models of theft
Capacity Allow for inclusion of large amounts of informa-
tion
Enables inclusion of potentially long watermarks
e.g. a signature of the legitimate model owner
Secrecy Presence of the watermark should be secret, water-
mark should be undetectable
Prevents watermark detection by an unauthorized
party
Efficiency Process of including and verifying a watermark to
ML model should be fast
Does not add large overhead
Unforgeability Watermark should be unforgeable No adversary can add additional watermarks to a
model, or claim ownership of existing watermark
from different party
Authentication Provide strong link between owner and watermark
that can be verified
Proves legitimate owner’s identity
Generality Watermarking algorithm should be independent of
the dataset and the ML algorithms used
Allows for broad use
because they cause easily detectable changes in the statisti-
cal distribution of the model parameters.
Wang et al. [41] proposed a strategy to create unde-
tectable watermarks in a white-box setting based on gener-
ative adversarial networks (GAN). The watermarked model
hO serves as the generator, whereas a watermark detec-
tor that detects changes in the statistical distribution of
the model parameters serves as a discriminator hD. Dur-
ing training, hO is encouraged to generate non-detectable
watermarks whereas hD tries to distinguish watermarked
from non-watermarked models. Both optimize the follow-
ing functions respectively:
hO : min(LO(θ) + λLR(θ)− λ2 log hD(θ)) (1)
hD : max(log hD(θnon) + log(1− hD(θ))) (2)
θnon refers to the parameters of non-watermarked previ-
ously trained models. Hence, the original model is encour-
aged to embed the watermark in a way that its parameter
distribution stays similar to a network without marking.
Fan et al. [10] suggested embedding passport-layers
with digital signatures into NNs for ownership verification.
The passport layers are inserted into convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs) after the convolutional layers in or-
der make model inference performance dependent on them.
Therefore, a passport function calculates hidden parameters
within those layers of the model. Hence, given a wrong
passport, it is not possible to achieve high inference accu-
racy because of the hidden parameters’ mismatch. For veri-
fication, the authors developed three mechanisms. The first
is to distribute the passport to the users, which comes at
the risk that the passports can be leaked, and that inference
is more difficult. The second relies on multitask learning
that alternates between training for the original task when
no passport is present and a combined loss function when it
is included. Normal inference can take place on the model
distributed without passport layers, and for verification in
front of a third party, the passport layers can be added to
detect the embedded signature. The third proposal relies on
adding passport layers for training only, but having an addi-
tional trigger dataset for remote ownership verification.
4
(a) Define a watermarking bit string and embed it into
the model parameters. For verification retrieve bit val-
ues from parameters and compare result with original
string.
(b) Train your model on the original data and a separate
watermarking trigger dataset. For verification query the
trigger set and verify the labels w.r.t. trigger set labels.
Figure 1: Two broad approaches for watermarking ML models.
Table 2: Techniques to embed watermarks into model parameters sorted alphabetically by author.
Method Approach Mean Verification
Uchida et al. [37] Embed bit string watermark to random
model parameters’ statistical bias
Embedding regularizer λLR(θ) included
in loss function: L(θ) = LO(θ) +
λLR(θ)
White-box
Fan et al. [10] Adding passport layers into NNs Passport function calculates hidden pa-
rameters; without them, model inference
performance is degraded
Black-box
Song et al. [34] Include information in model parameters
e.g. least significant bit or sign)
Develop correlated value encoding to
maximize correlation between model pa-
rameters and a given secret
Wang et al. [41] Create non-detectable watermarked pa-
rameters
Use GAN-approach to encourage water-
marked model parameters to stay similar
to non-watermarked ones
White-box
Wang et al. [39] Extend [37], include watermarks into
quickly converging model parameters
Additional NN used to embed and project
watermark
White-box
3.2 Using Pre-defined Inputs as Triggers
The second category of watermarking techniques works
by sampling a predefined data sequence, referred to as car-
rier or trigger dataset, or key K. This K is drawn from
some distribution, different from the training distribution,
to enforce a hidden function into the model, additionally to
its original task. That is possible because of NNs capabil-
ity of memorizing random noise or special pattern through
over-parametrization [14]. Over-parametrization refers to
the model containing more parameters than it requires to
learn the original task. The redundant parameters can be
used by a legitimate model owner in order to learn hid-
den functions, e.g. a watermark. Such a process can also
be called back-dooring [1]. In watermarking, it is usually
used to train a model to deliberately output “wrong” predic-
tions on the trigger dataset. When testing whether a model
is an illegitimate copy, the legal owner can query K to the
(black-box) model and calculate the percentage of agree-
ment between that model’s prediction and the original labels
of K. If the resulting percentage exceeds a certain thresh-
old (should be close to 1), then the model is likely to be
an illegitimate copy [43]. See Table 3 for an overview on
methods that rely on using a trigger dataset to watermark
ML models.
Le Merrer et al. [19] proposed directly marking the
model’s action itself by slightly moving the decision bound-
ary through adversarial retraining such that specific queries
can exploit it. Therefore, their approach first identifies ad-
versarial samples and normal data points that are very close
to the decision boundary. Then, the trigger sample is com-
posed by 50% of the adversarial examples, and 50% of the
data points that do not cause misclassification, but are close
to decision boundary. Afterwards, the trained classifier is
fine-tuned to predict the trigger sample points to their cor-
5
Table 3: Techniques using a specific trigger dataset as a watermark sorted alphabetically by author.
Method Approach Mean Verification
Adi et al. [1] Abstract color images with random
classes as trigger set
Non-trivial ownership through com-
mitments on trigger dataset
Black-box
Chen et al. [7] Include model owner’s binary signa-
ture in output activations
Cluster output activations in two
groups (represent 0 and 1), use them
to represent signature bits
Black-box
Jia et al. [16] Entangled watermarks through train-
ing with soft nearest neighbor loss
Model learns common features of
original data and data that encodes
watermarks
Black-box
Le Merrer et al. [19] Adversarial decision boundary mod-
ification through trigger sample con-
sisting of adversarial examples
Choose set of true and false adver-
sarial samples close to the decision
boundary and alter boundary such
that all of them are correctly classi-
fied
Black-box
Li et al. [21] Null embedding watermark consist-
ing of a pixel pattern
Change original image pixels accord-
ing to patterns to extreme positive or
negative values before training
Black-box
Namba et al. [24] Exponential weighting: enforce
watermark predictions with higher
weights during training
Choose a trigger dataset from train-
ing data and assign wrong labels as
watermark
Black-box
Rouhani et al. [28] Include watermark in probability
density function of network layers
Train model such that means of those
distributions represent the watermark
Black/White-box
Yang et al. [43] Train additional model (called in-
grainer) that contains the watermark
information via its prediction on
training data
Embed watermark information into
the same neural connections that
are responsible for representing the
main classification task by adding in-
grainer loss to normal model’s loss
function
Black-box
rect original class. See Figure 2 for a visualization of this
approach. The resulting labeled data points are supposed to
serve as an expressive trigger set. Namba et al. [24] argue
that this method offers weak integrity because, nowadays,
adversarial (re)training is broadly used to create more ro-
bust models, hence a non-watermarked model can be mis-
taken to be watermarked.
Adi et al. [1] consider watermarking from a crypto-
graphic point of view. The authors generate abstract color
images with randomly assigned classes as a trigger set. In
order to guarantee non-trivial ownership, a set of commit-
ments is created over the image/label pairs before embed-
ding the watermark into the model. Thereby, at verifica-
tion time, ownership can be proven by selectively revealing
these commitments. A similar approach was also described
by Zhang et al. [44]. They include irrelevant data samples,
e.g. from another unrelated dataset, as watermarks into the
training data. Those samples are labeled with classes from
the original model output. During training, the model learns
to assign real images and those trigger samples to the corre-
sponding classes.
Rouhani et al. [28] developed an approach of including
the watermark as a T -bit string into the probability density
function (pdf ) of the data abstraction obtained in different
network layers. These layers’ activation maps at interme-
diate network layers roughly follow Gaussian distributions.
The legitimate model’s owner can choose in how many of
those, they want to embed the watermark string. After-
wards, the network is trained to incorporate the watermark
information in the mean values of the selected distributions.
A projection matrix A can be used to map the selected dis-
tribution centers to the binary watermark vector. In a white-
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(a) Original decision boundary. (b) After fine-tuning.
Figure 2: Visualization of Le Merrer et al. [19], figure adapted from [19]. Squares indicate adversarial examples for the cor-
responding color, circles correspond data points that lie close to the decision boundary but are correctly classified. Decision
boundary is altered to correctly classify the adversarial examples.
box setting, this matrix A is utilized for verification. For
black-box verification, a trigger dataset can be constructed
from data points whose features lie in the model’s unused
regions, i.e. samples at the tail regions of the pdf. According
to the authors, such data points are more stable than adver-
sarial examples. In contrast to methods including the water-
mark in the static model content, like Uchida et al. [37], it
changes the dynamic content of the model, namely the acti-
vations that depend on the data and the model. This results
in a more flexible and not that easily detectable change [28].
Chen et al. [7] proposed taking the model owner’s binary
signature as a watermark for an NN. Their aim is to com-
bine the advantage from black-box and white-box water-
mark extraction, i.e. weaker assumptions on the adversary’s
power and large capacity at the same time. To include it into
the model, they build a model-dependent encoding scheme.
Therefore, they cluster the model’s output activations into
two groups according to their similarities, one group for
class 0, and one for class 1. Their approach relies on in-
cluding the signature in the model’s output activations that
correspond to one of these classes and thereby represent sig-
nature bits. For watermark verification, a designated trigger
dataset can be passed to the model in order to retrieve the
signature.
3.2.1 Trigger set creation based on original training
data
Some watermarking approaches rely on inserting forms of
digital watermarks into the original training data in order to
create the model’s trigger set. See Table 4 for an overview
on methods that use original training data to generate the
trigger dataset.
The approach by Guo et al. [12] generates an n-bit sig-
nature of the model owner, embeds it into the training data,
e.g. images, and fine-tunes trained models on embedded de-
vices to predict the signed data into different classes than the
original data. Signed data can then be used as a trigger to a
model suspected to be an illegitimate copy of some original
model.
Zhang et al. [44] described algorithms for watermarking
NNs for image classification with remote black-box verifi-
cation mechanisms. One of their algorithms embeds mean-
ingful content together with the original training data as a
watermark. An example for this approach is embedding a
specific string (which could be the company name) into a
picture of the training set when predicting images, and as-
signing a different label than the original one to the modified
sample. Instead of a meaningful string, it is also possible to
embed noise into the original training data. This approach
is based on the intuition that NNs exhibit memorization ca-
pabilities that enable them to automatically learn patterns
of embedded watermarks from the training data. A simi-
lar approach to the first algorithm of Zhang et al. [44] was
proposed by Li et al. [22] who combine some ordinary data
samples with an exclusive ‘logo’ and train the model to pre-
dict them into a specific label. To keep these trigger sam-
ples as close as possible to the original samples, an autoen-
coder is used whose discriminator is trained to distinguish
between training and trigger samples with the watermarks.
Sakazawa et al. [31] proposed a cumulative and visual de-
coding of watermarks in NNs, such that pattern embedded
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Table 4: Techniques to embed watermarks into the training data in order to create the trigger dataset.
Method Approach Mean Verification
Guo et al. [12] Model owner’s signature embedded into
the training data
Use signed training data samples as trig-
gers to verify watermarks
Black-box
Li et al. [22] Include “logo” in the training data im-
ages, use an auto-encoder to make trigger
samples close to original data
Train the model to predict the water-
marked images in a specific way and use
them as a trigger
Black-box
Zhang et al. [44] Include (meaningful) information in the
training data samples
Train the model to predict them in a spe-
cific way, such that this data acts as a wa-
termark trigger
Black-box
into the training data can become visual for an authentica-
tion by a third party.
3.2.2 Robust watermarking
A problem of watermarking methods that rely on special
model behavior for trigger data is that they are actually
trained on two different (and independent) data distribu-
tions. The first one represents the distribution of the orig-
inal training task, the second one the distribution of the
watermark triggers [16, 21]. Research has shown that be-
cause these tasks are more or less unrelated, it is possible
to remove the watermarks through model-retraining or fine-
tuning.
Therefore, Yang et al. [43] showed that, for example dis-
tillation [27] is effective to remove watermarks. This results
from the fact that the watermark information is redundant
and independent of the main task, hence they are not trans-
ferred to the resulting surrogate model. As a solution, the
authors described an ‘ingrain’-watermarking method that
regularizes the NN with an additional NN they refer to as
ingrainer model gω . That ingrainer contains the watermark
information via its prediction on training data Ds. The wa-
termark carrier set K is sampled from a different distribu-
tion and g is trained to overfit on K. The original model hθ
is then trained to represent the knowledge of the ingrainer.
This is done through regularization with a specific ingrain
loss: C(hθ,T (x), gω(x)) with T being the temperature in
the softmax loss. The aim is to embed watermark informa-
tion into the same neural connections that are responsible
for representing the main classification task. Therefore, the
joint loss function over the training data Ds is given by:
LDs(hθ) =
1
|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds
C(hθ(x), y) + δC(hθ,T (x), gω(x)).
(3)
The labels are indicated by y, whereas λ determines the de-
gree of ingrain.
Jia et al. [16] proposed a similar idea that relies on ‘en-
tangled watermarking embeddings’. The entanglement is
used to make the model extract common features of the
data that represent the original task and the data that en-
codes the watermarks and stems from a different distribu-
tion. Therefore, the authors apply the soft nearest neigh-
bor loss (SNNL) [32]. Informally spoken, the SNNL mea-
sures entanglement over labeled data, i.e. how close pairs
of points from the same class are relative to pairs of points
from different classes [11]. Points from different groups
that are closer relative to the average distance between two
points are called entangled. Using entanglement when in-
cluding a watermark ensures that the watermark and the
original task are represented by the same sub-model and
not by different ones that may be harmed during extrac-
tion. Hence, it becomes more difficult for an attacker to
extract the model without its watermarks. At the same time,
through the entanglement, removing the watermark results
in a decrease of model performance on the original task.
Namba et al. [24] described a method they called ‘ex-
ponential weighting’. They generate a watermark trigger
by random sampling from the training distribution and as-
signing wrong labels to that sample for training. As the
trigger inputs stem from the training distribution, they can-
not be distinguished from real examples when querying the
model. However, as the trigger set causes the model to
overfit, the watermark would be vulnerable to pruning or re-
training (see Section 4). To overcome this, the authors pro-
pose embedding these samples by exponential weighting,
i.e. imprint trigger samples with greater force and cause the
model to learn them profoundly. This idea relies on the fact
that if a large number of model parameters with small ab-
solute values are involved in a prediction, the result would
be changed by pruning, which might not be the case with
solely few large parameters involved in prediction. The ex-
ponential weighting method achieves this state by increas-
ing the weights of the parameters that significantly con-
tribute to the prediction exponentially.
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Figure 3: Watermark pattern, figure adapted from [21].
Li et al. [21] developed a ‘null embedding’ for including
watermarks into the model’s initial training, such that ad-
versaries are not able to remove them or include their own
watermarks on top. Therefore, they generate a filter pat-
tern p consisting of black and white pixels and place them
on additional training images. Such a pattern is shown in
Figure 3. Image pixels under the white pattern pixels are
changed to a very large negative number, image pixels un-
der black pattern pixels are changed to a very large posi-
tive number, and pixels under gray pattern pixels stay un-
changed. The predicted class on the image needs to stay the
same as on the original image. Using extreme values and
setting strong deterministic constraint on the optimization
when learning lead to strong watermark inclusion. To cre-
ate a binding between the owner and the pixel pattern, the
authors propose using the owner’s signature and a determin-
istic hash function to generate the pattern [21].
3.2.3 Unique watermarking
The shortcoming of most of the above-mentioned water-
marking algorithms is that the watermark is universal over
all instances of the model. Hence, when a stolen copy of
a model appears somewhere, it is impossible for the legiti-
mate model owner to identify which of the parties that had
access to the model stole it. Therefore, a major current re-
search focus lies on creating unique watermarks per user to
deployed models. The requirements for such unique wa-
termarking schemes are the same as the ones for common
watermarking methods (see Table 1), but extended by the
two following points [6]:
1. Uniqueness. Watermarks should be unique for each
user. This serves to identify model instances individu-
ally.
2. Scalability. Unique watermarking schemes should
scale to many users in a system. This allows for a
large-scale distribution of the target model.
See Table 5 for an overview on methods generating unique
watermarks.
Chen et al. [6] proposed an end-to-end collusion-secure
watermarking framework for white-box settings. Their ap-
proach is based on anti-collusion codebooks for individual
users as unique watermarks, which are incorporated in the
pdf of the model weights. The incorporation is achieved by
using a watermark-specific regularization loss during train-
ing.
Xu et al. [42] embed a serial number to NNs for model
ownership identification. Their solution generates a unique
serial number as a watermark and creates an endorsement
by a certification authority on it. Serial numbers are gen-
erated by the owner through a digital signature algorithm
(based on the owner’s private key). During model training,
the serial number is fitted into the model, together with the
original task by having a second loss, such that owner verifi-
cation can be achieved by sending trigger inputs, extracting
the serial number and verifying it with the certification au-
thority.
3.3 Using model fingerprints to identify instances
Instead of explicitly adding watermark information into
an ML model, some methods use existing features of the
model in order to identify potentially stolen instances. This
offers the advantages that no overhead is added to the orig-
inal training task and that the model’s original prediction
abilities are not affected. However, as those methods do
not actively alter the model in order to include a watermark,
they will only be mentioned very briefly in this document.
Zhao et al. [45] use adversarial examples as a trigger set
to watermark NNs. They identify some special adversar-
ial examples within NNs that they call ‘adversarial marks’.
Those adversarial marks differ from traditional adversarial
examples in their transferability: they show high transfer-
ability between models that are similar, and low transfer-
ability between models that are different. The authors argue
that adversarial marks represent a suitable watermark trig-
ger as they are difficult to remove due to the number and
type of adversarial examples being practically infinite.
Lukas et al. [23] also exploit the transferability of ad-
versarial examples in order to verify the ownership of ML
models. They define the class of conferrable adversarial
examples. Those examples transfer only to surrogate mod-
els of a target model (potential illegitimate copies), but not
to reference models, i.e. similar models trained on similar
data for a related task. By querying those examples to a
model, one can identify whether this model is a copy of the
target model or not. The authors also propose a generation
method for this class of adversarial examples and prove that
this watermarking method is robust against distillation [27]
and weaker attacks.
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Table 5: Techniques to generate unique watermarks that can be verified by querying a trigger dataset.
Method Approach Mean Verification
Chen et al. [6] End-to-end unique watermarking scheme
based on anti-collusion codebooks for in-
dividual users
Incorporate watermarks in probability den-
sity function of model weights through
watermarking-specific loss
White-box
Xu et al. [42] Embed unique serial number based on
model owner’s signature and create en-
dorsement by certification authority
Fit model with two loss functions, for the
original task, and the watermark through
trigger inputs
Black-box
4 Attacks against Watermarking
Both above-mentioned types of watermarking schemes
initially exhibit some drawbacks. This section first dis-
cusses those weaknesses, and then presents the different
kinds of attacks against watermarking approaches.
When embedding watermarks in the model parameters,
Wang et al. [40] showed that many schemes change the pa-
rameters’ probability distribution, which makes the water-
marks easily detectable.
For trigger-based watermarking schemes, Hitaj et al.
[14] formulated the general disadvantage for the scenario
of public verification. They argue that after the verification
algorithm is run against a stolen model, the adversary is in
possession of the trigger set, which enables him to fine-tune
the model on those data points in order to remove the wa-
termark. Hence, in order to run several verifications, the
original trigger set needs to be divided, or there have to be
several trigger sets. This approach, thus, has its limitation
due to the maximum amount of backdoors that can be em-
bedded in an NN.
Additionally to those general shortcomings, there exist
concrete attacks against NN watermarking. These attacks
can be grouped into five different categories, namely wa-
termark detection, suppression, removal, overwriting, and
forging.
4.1 Watermark Detection
The weakest form of attack against watermarking
schemes is concerned with detection of watermarks in NNs.
Discovering the presence of a watermark in a stolen model
gives an adversary the opportunity to adapt this model’s be-
havior in order avoid watermark detection by the legitimate
party.
Wang et al. [41] and Shafieinejad et al. [33] indepen-
dently proposed a property inference attack in order to
detect the presence of watermarks within NN parameters.
Their approach relies on comparing the models’ weight
distributions between watermarked and non-watermarked
NNs. Thereby, they are able to detect the watermarks in-
cluded by [37] and [28], which both cause a shift in the
watermarked models’ weigh distributions. Wang et al. [41]
trained their detector on 512 shadow models (half marked,
half unmarked) and found that their approach works best
provided white-box access to the potentially stolen mod-
els and the training datasets, but still achieves over 75%
of detection accuracy on the DeepSign [28] framework by
Rouhani et al. when the shadow models are trained on dif-
ferent datasets and with different architectures.
4.2 Watermark Suppression
In some cases, for example, when watermark removal is
not possible through appropriate effort, it might be enough
for an adversary to be able to suppress the specific model
behavior on the watermark trigger dataset to avoid detec-
tion. Namba et al. [24] describe such a suppression method
that works for instance against the watermarking method
proposed by Zhang et al. [44]. The approach relies on using
an autoencoder trained with samples from the original train-
ing distribution. Before queries are forwarded to the stolen
model, they are passed through the autoencoder. The recon-
struction loss of legitimate inputs from the original training
distribution is rather small whereas it is large on samples
from a different distribution. As the trigger samples in some
approaches indeed stem from a different distribution than
the original data, the value of the reconstruction loss can
be used to identify them. In case of being confronted with
a trigger query that potentially stems from the legitimate
model owner, the autoencoder modifies the query in a way
that the stolen model’s prediction on it does not correspond
to the watermark anymore to avoid detection.
Also, Hitaj et al. [14] showed that even when a water-
mark is difficult to remove, it is still possible to prevent
verification by a legitimate owner. The authors, therefore,
implemented an ensemble attack that relies on stealing n
models from different providers and using them as an en-
semble for prediction. Individual watermark triggers are
suppressed because they are usually unique to one specific
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model, whereas the rest of the ensemble models does not
react to them. Additionally, the authors proposed an attack
similar to Namba et al. [24] that relies on detecting trigger
queries to a stolen model. In case, a trigger is detected, a
random class from the model output space is returned in or-
der to avoid suspicion by the legal owner.
4.3 Watermark Removal
Instead of suppressing the model’s reaction on trigger in-
puts, an adversary might also try to entirely remove the wa-
termark from a stolen model. The threat model depends on
the attacker’s knowledge about (i) the presence of a water-
mark, (ii) the underlying watermarking scheme, and on the
(iii) availability of data, e.g. for fine-tuning or retraining.
Especially the last point is interesting to consider because
many attacks rely on the assumption that an adversary has
large amounts of data available to fine-tune. In reality, an
adversary possessing a sufficiently large dataset to train a
good model might be less motivated to steal a model, in-
stead of training it from scratch [9].
The most general methods that can be used to remove
watermarks can be grouped as follows [43].
• Fine-Tuning: use initial model parameters and fine-
tune them to a refinement set. Thereby, it is possible to
improve a model for certain kinds of data. This process
might remove the watermark when model parameters
or prediction behaviors are changed.
• Pruning: cut some redundant parameters and obtain a
new model that looks different from the original model
but still has a similar high prediction accuracy. If the
parameters containing the watermark are cut, it is no
longer possible to verify the watermark.
• Rounding: reduce the precision of the parameters. If
the model strongly overfits the watermark triggers, or
the watermark is included in the parameters directly,
rounding might destroy the watermark information.
• Fine-Pruning: first prune the model architecture, then
continue to train. In the benign setting, this helps re-
cover some of the accuracy that may have been lost
during pruning. In the presence of backdoors, this also
contributes to overwriting any behavior learned from
backdoors [16].
• Model Compression: optimize the memory needed to
fit the model while preserving its accuracy on the task.
This might be necessary in mobile or embedded de-
vices with limited resources. Model compression is
performed by, for example, removing insignificant pa-
rameters and pruning links between neurons. This can
affect the watermark reliability, especially if the neu-
rons used for the watermarking task are different from
the ones of the original task, because then, they can be
pruned without losing accuracy in the original task.
• Distillation [13]: transfer the prediction power of a
potentially very complex teacher model to a less com-
plex student model. This approach finds application,
for example, in low-power environments, where sim-
pler models are to be preferred. It can, however, not be
guaranteed that the watermark is also included in the
simpler model.
• Transfer Learning: update the classification task of a
model to a related but slightly different task. There-
fore, model layers towards the output are modified.
This approach saves computational power because
large parts of trained models’ weights can be applied to
the new task with solely small changes. However, the
changes within the model layers can lead to a removal
of the watermark.
• Computation Optimization: reduce computation time
ofNNs by low-rank expansion techniques to approxi-
mate convolution layers. The reduction might as well
lead to a watermark removal.
• Backdoor Removal: remove functionalities in the NN
that are not relevant for the original task. A backdoor
consists of samples that the model is trained on to pre-
dict incorrectly, this can, for example, be the water-
mark trigger. Li et al. [21] pointed out that if the wa-
termarking task is indeed a backdoor function that is
too loosely related with the original task, it is possi-
ble to remove it by normal backdoor removal attacks
against NNs, such as [38].
• Retraining: an ML model might be trained continu-
ously, instead of being trained once and then released
for prediction. Through retraining, models can adapt
to potential shifts in the underlying data distribution
over time. While retraining, the watermark might be
damaged.
Additionally to the above-mentioned approaches, there
also exist more specific attacks proposed in literature.
Chen et al. [9] proposed a framework to remove water-
marks based on model fine-tuning. They designed a learn-
ing rate schedule that makes the model forget the watermark
when being fine-tuned with additional data. In addition to
the learning rate scheduling, they proposed using elastic
weight consolidation [18]. This technique can be used to
fine-tune a model to forget the task it was initially trained
on when being trained on a new use case.
Shafieinejad et al. [33] developed black-box and white-
box attacks to remove watermarks. Their idea relies on
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the fact that when using additional data points as triggers
for watermarking, those points do not belong in the main
distribution for the classification problem. As they are de-
liberately misclassified, they are a form of outliers that the
model never learns to predict correctly. Hence, fine-tuning
with additional data, or using regularization on the marked
model to avoid overfitting to those outliers is able to remove
watermarks.
Wang et al. [39] described NNs as directed graphs and
proposed a model isomorphism attack in order to remove
watermarks. An adversary could use an isomorphic graph
in order to replace the original one. This isomorphic graph
would not necessarily contain the watermark anymore.
4.4 Watermark Overwriting
Within this attack setting, an adversary knows the under-
lying watermarking scheme, but has no knowledge about
the legitimate owner’s watermark or trigger set. The adver-
sary can use this knowledge in order to embed a new wa-
termark into the model. In a weak form of attack, the orig-
inal watermark is still present, such that both watermarks
co-exist in the model. Therefore, the legitimate owner can
no longer prove (unique) ownership due to ambiguity. In a
stronger version of this attack, the adversary might be able
to replace the original watermark entirely with the new one.
Thereby, the entire ownership claim is taken over [21].
Wang et al. [40] proposed an attack on how to remove
the watermarks included by Uchida et al. [37]. They use the
model parameters’ variance to detect the watermarks. How-
ever, without knowledge of the secret key X , they do not
know to which parameters the watermark is embedded. To
overcome this, they introduced two strategies, overwriting
and multi-embedding. The first strategy is able to remove
the old watermark, such that it is no longer detectable, and
at the same time to embed the adversary’s own new water-
mark to the model. The second strategy embeds a different
watermark on the watermarked model every training epoch
such that the original watermark gets removed.
4.5 Watermark Forging
In some cases, the adversary might also be able to forge
a watermark on a given network. This might be done by
recovering the legitimate owner’s trigger set and claiming
ownership (if there is no binding between the trigger and
the author), or adding a new watermark.
Xu et al. [42] described an attack setting in which at-
tackers try to find the watermark trigger inputs of an NN and
then pretend having watermarked this model themselves. To
overcome this threat, the authors propose adding authentic-
ity to the watermark and including a binding relationship
between the model owner and the watermark.
Fan et al. [10] proposed an ambiguity attack that aims
at creating an ambiguous situation in which a watermark is
reverse-engineered from an already watermarked NN. With
the watermark information or triggers at hand, an adversary
can claim ownership in case the watermark does not clearly
bind to a specific owner, for example, through a unique sig-
nature.
Additionally, the adversary might also attempt to find a
fake trigger set or watermark that coincidentally acts like a
real watermark but actually is not. For example, Guo et al.
[12] argued that in the Adi et al. [1] approach, in which the
trigger set consists of abstract random images, an adversary
can easily find another set of random images that coincides
with another signature.
5 Choosing the right watermarking scheme
Not every watermarking scheme is similarly strong or
suited to every context. Therefore, it is useful to analyze
the most common threat spaces in order to identify appro-
priate model watermarking schemes. Table 6 provides an
overview on such threat spaces and watermarking schemes
addressing them, respectively.
Additionally, it is possible to discuss the question of
choosing or creating reliable watermarking methods by
evaluating existing ones with respect to the security require-
ments presented in Table 1.
• Fidelity: To guarantee fidelity, existing watermarking
schemes aim at preserving model performance on the
original task. Depending on the scheme, this can be
achieved through different means, e.g. only minimally
altering the original decision boundary [19], or includ-
ing the watermark to early converging model weights
[39].
• Robustness: If the trigger dataset stems from a sig-
nificantly different distribution than the original data,
as in [1, 10], the model learns two different (and in-
dependent) tasks. Therefore, it is possible to extract
them independently, or to remove the watermark with-
out causing an impact on the model’s prediction per-
formance. Thus, to achieve robustness, watermarking
schemes need to take measures to create a relation be-
tween both tasks, and to enforce the watermark to the
model such that it cannot be removed easily.
• Reliability: Certain factors can influence watermark
reliability. First, similarly as for robustness, if the trig-
ger set stems from a different distribution than the orig-
inal dataset, reactions of the stolen model to the water-
mark triggers can be suppressed by an attacker. Sec-
ond, all schemes that rely solely on white-box verifi-
cation, might offer lower reliability, as such access to
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Table 6: Threat spaces and appropriate model watermarking schemes.
Threat
Space
Description Methods
Anonymous
model
stealing
The attacker is not aware of the presence of a watermark when stealing the model, hence,
does not take specific precautions against its detection. The legitimate owner is interested in
discovering stolen instances but not in uniquely identifying the thief.
[28, 41]
Identifiable
model
stealing
The attacker is not aware of the presence of a watermark when stealing the model, hence,
does not take specific precautions against its detection. The legitimate owner is interested in
discovering stolen instances and uniquely identifying the thief.
[6, 42]
Watermark
suppression
The attacker steals the watermarked model and aims at preventing its detection, e.g. by sup-
pressing “unusual” queries to the model (with data from different data distribution than the
original task).
[22, 24]
Watermark
Forging
The attacker steals the watermarked model and claims ownership of the existing watermark. [1, 7, 12,
42, 44]
Watermark
Overwriting
The attacker steals the watermarked model and tries to include an additional watermark on
top.
[21]
Watermark
Removal
The attacker tries to either extract the watermarked model without the watermark or to remove
the watermark after successful theft.
[16, 24,
43]
all potentially stolen model instances might not always
be a realistic assumption.
• Integrity: Quantifying watermarking schemes’ in-
tegrity is a challenging task, as it requires judging how
(potentially all other) non-watermarked models react
on the given trigger set. A good trigger set is charac-
terized by the uniqueness of the watermarked model’s
predictions on it, in order to accuse no honest parties
with similar models of theft.
• Capacity: Depending on the watermarking scheme,
capacity can refer to different aspects. For approaches
that rely on embedding a bit string into the model,
capacity is usually measured in the length of that bit
string. For trigger set-based approaches, capacity can
be related to the size of the trigger set, and, or in
relation to, the number of trigger points needed for
one (unique) verification. Approaches that need few
queries, like [16], might allow for more independent
watermark verifications.
• Secrecy: Watermarking schemes that change the
model parameters in a detectable way, as for example
[37], violate the secrecy requirement. To prevent wa-
termark detection, adding them to the dynamic model
content [29], or taking measures to force the model pa-
rameters to stay roughly the same [22], are possible
solution.
• Efficiency: Efficiency can be evaluated with regard
to embedding and verification time, i.e. the overhead
in training and the computation time, or number of
queries needed to verify the watermark. Most existing
work does not explicitly evaluate computational over-
head of their approaches. Jia et al. [16] present one of
the few evaluations of efficiency, and comes to the con-
clusion that the trigger set should consist of more than
half the amount of data samples as the original data.
Therefore, the model needs to train with 150-200%
of the original data. Especially for large datasets, this
might result in large overhead.
• Unforgeability: Watermarking schemes that rely on
non-specific data points as trigger data [1, 12] might
enable an attacker to choose (random) different points
than the initial watermark, in order to claim having
marked the model with them as triggers. Approaches
that do not allow already marked models to be marked
again, like [21], can prevent this threat.
• Authentication: However, if the watermark triggers do
not bind to the legitimate model owner, it is still pos-
sible that an attacker identifies the included watermark
and just claims ownership. Using, for example, com-
mitments [1], or signatures [42], to create a link to the
legitimate model owner offers the possibility for au-
thentication, and can avoid such unauthorized claims
and serve to identify ownership unambiguously.
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• Generality: The aspect of generality can be consid-
ered on several levels. First, most existing water-
marking schemes (apart from, for example, [16]) are
solely applied to image data. For many of them, eval-
uation of their generalizability to different data types
remains an open question. Second, not all existing
schemes directly generalize to all datasets, for exam-
ple [7] needs a different watermark encoding scheme
on each dataset, even with the same data type, which
can be considered as lacking one form of generality.
Additionally to the evaluation of the security require-
ments, the following considerations should be taken into
account.
First, in trigger set-based watermarking approaches, sev-
eral queries from the trigger set are posed to the model and
the accordance rate of its predictions with the trigger set’s
original labels is calculated. However, defining a suitable
threshold of percentage to identify a stolen model requires
thorough tuning. If the threshold is set too high, slight mod-
ifications in a stolen model might already be sufficient to
prevent watermark detection, which violates the reliability
requirement. If the threshold is set too low, different models
might erroneously be identified as stolen model instances,
which violates the integrity requirement. Hence, the choice
of a threshold also expresses a trade-off between reliability
and integrity.
Second, watermarking schemes embedding watermarks
into the ML models’ parameters without taking precautions
do not only leave a detectable trace in the model and, hence,
violate the secrecy requirement, but they also often rely on
white-box access for verification. Even though in some sce-
narios, the latter might be feasible, still, assuming black-
box access often is a more realistic scenario. Therefore,
such schemes might be suitable only to very specific appli-
cations.
Finally, due to their instability, their potentially low ro-
bustness against fine-tuning or retraining, and, in some
cases, their transferability, that might violate watermark in-
tegrity, adversarial examples used for watermarking [19] or
fingerprinting [23, 45]) might exhibit important drawbacks.
Namba et al. [24] point out that especially an adaption of
the model’s decision boundary according to some adversar-
ial examples, as in [19], might be likely to violate the in-
tegrity requirement because its effect is similar to the effect
of adversarial retraining, a method commonly used to make
ML models more robust.
6 Challenges and Future Opportunities
Based on the evaluation of existing schemes and their se-
curity requirements, this section presents further challenges
and promising future research directions.
As stated in the previous section, most watermarking
schemes currently apply solely to image data. Only few
exceptions, e.g. [16], have proven the applicability of their
schemes to other data types. Future work will have to fo-
cus on examining the generality and universal applicability
of existing schemes, and, if necessary, their adaptation or
extension.
Moreover, most watermarking approaches proposed so
far apply solely to classification tasks. There exist only
few works on watermarking in other ML domains, like re-
inforcement learning, e.g. [4]. Therefore, the development
of watermarking schemes for other ML applications repre-
sents a promising future challenge.
Furthermore, existing watermarking schemes are mainly
applied and evaluated on rather small research datasets, like
MNIST [20]. Therefore, the question of their scalability re-
mains open. Approaches that require training with up to
double the initial amount of data might, hence, not be appli-
cable to every scenario. Thus, future work should assess the
practical applicability of existing watermarking schemes to
larger real-world datasets and analyze whether the proper-
ties they exhibit on the research datasets (efficiency of train-
ing, reasonable trigger set size, integrity, etc.) hold.
Finally, once that watermarking schemes meet all the
technical requirements, another challenge will lie in their
adaptation to real-world workflows. Especially the juridi-
cal and organizational workflows will have to be adapted
in order to enable asserting ownership claims based on the
watermarks.
7 Concluding Remarks
Nowadays, ML is applied to an increasing number of do-
mains. With growing complexity of the applied models,
using watermarks to protect intellectual property incorpo-
rated in those models has become a major focus both in
academia and industry. The document at hand explored the
landscape of existing watermarking approaches and attacks
against them. It provided an evaluation of the watermark-
ing security requirement met by the different approaches
and pointed at potential strength, shortcomings, and future
work directions. Therefore, it can serve as a reference for
researchers and ML practitioners over all domains.
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